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This paper investigates the role of peer effects in the employee welfare policies of orga-
nizations. Using US panel data for a sample of 11,451 firm-year observations from 1996
to 2017, we find that firms’ employee welfare decisions are driven by their peers and show
that peer firms play a significant role in defining corporate employee welfare policies.
Our findings are robust to various sensitivity checks, including alternative definitions of
employee welfare, alternative peer proxies and several identification strategies. Our addi-
tional analysis shows that herding behaviour is prevalent in followers, who mimic leaders’
behaviour, but we do not find any such relationship for industry leaders. Further, we show
evidence suggesting that mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures are driving the peer
effects. Finally, we examine the economic consequences of peer mimicking in employee
welfare policies and show that it improves focal firms’ value and innovation. Our findings
on firms’ peer effects and herding behaviour have policy implications.
Introduction
The competition in today’s world forces firms
to adopt employee-friendly policies and work-
place standards. It is, therefore, vital to compre-
hend themechanism throughwhich employee poli-
cies are shaped. Earlier studies in this area sug-
gest that employee-friendly practices positively in-
fluence productivity and performance (Ertugrul,
2013; Jiao, 2010). However, it is assumed in earlier
research that a firm’s employee welfare policies are
made autonomously, irrespective of the policies of
their peers and competitors, which simply means
that every firm undertakes such policies according
to its business environment. Cao, Liang and Zhan
(2019) document that the impact of the social com-
ponent of peers’ corporate activities, which also
include employee welfare, is as yet an unexplored
area. As such, the importance of peer firms’ ac-
tions and characteristics is mostly disregarded in
a firm’s employee welfare policies.
Conversely, peer firms play a strong role in
determining the corporate policies of firms, and
researchers have contributed to this stream of
literature by providing evidence that shows the
importance of social interaction and peer effects
in a firm’s financial policies. For example, a firm’s
corporate investment policy largely depends on
its peer firms’ investment and cash flow manage-
ment strategies (Dougal, Parsons and Titman,
2015). Similarly, there is evidence suggesting
that the financing decisions of a company’s lo-
cal peers significantly influence its own capital
structure decisions (Gao, Ng and Wang, 2011;
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Leary and Roberts, 2014). Recently, the adoption
of employee welfare policies has been on the rise
worldwide, and it is one of the top environmental,
social and governance (ESG) issues. This is evi-
dent from the fact that around 48% of the S&P500
companies in the USA discuss their employee
treatment, highlighting issues such as business
continuity, safety and support programmes (Nor-
ton, 2020). Thus, there is an obvious question
to ask in whether peer firms’ strategies matter in
shaping a firm’s employee welfare policies.
This paper examines the effect of peer firms’ em-
ployee welfare strategies on a firm’s employee wel-
fare policies. The motivation for investigating this
question arises from the fact that human capital is
considered as one of the most important assets of
any organization. The significance of skilled hu-
man resources can be ascertained from the fact
that, in today’s competitive world, skilled employ-
ees are key to process innovation and quality im-
provements (Zingales, 2000). Thus, to retain their
skilled workforce, firms have to invest in their hu-
man capital, at least if their industry peers and
competitors are doing so; otherwise, they risk los-
ing this asset because employees can choose to
switch employment if other firms offer added ben-
efits.
Using a sample of 11,451 firm-year observations
for the period 1996–2017, we examine the role of
peer firms’ welfare policies in shaping the corpo-
rate welfare policies of US organizations. We mea-
sure a firm’s peers through Hoberg and Phillips’
(2016) Text-basedNetwork IndustryClassification
(TNIC). Specifically, peers are defined as firms
with similar product descriptions in their 10-K fil-
ings as the focal firm. This measure uses the num-
ber of common words in a firm’s product descrip-
tion to describe its industry and ranges from 0% to
100%. The results show that firms’ employee wel-
fare policies largely depend on the welfare poli-
cies of their product market peers. After control-
ling for various peer and firm-level characteristics,
including industry and year fixed effects, the re-
sults remained persistent and unaltered. Our re-
sults are also robust to the various alternative sam-
ple composition and other sensitivity checks, in-
cluding alternate definitions of peer firms and al-
ternate proxies for employee welfare.
Also, as peers’ employee welfare policies may be
related to some common unobservable factors, en-
dogeneity has been regarded as one of the main
concerns in research involving peer firms or in-
dustry averages. For example, peers’ average em-
ployee welfare may be higher because the indus-
try is labour-intensive, there is high competition
or scarcity of human resources in that industry.
In relation to this, reverse causality is a potential
threat as it is possible that the employee welfare
policy of the firm is so important that it impacts on
peer policies. We address these concerns in our ro-
bustness checks and through the application of in-
strumental variables. We utilize state welfare as an
instrument to revalidate our main results. More-
over, in the additional analysis, we test whether fol-
lowers mimic the leader’s behaviour or otherwise.
Consistent with the reputational herding model,
we find that followers herd the leaders in their wel-
fare policies. Finally, we also show that mimetic
and normative pressures drive the peer effects, and
following peers in employee welfare results in bet-
ter performance and innovation.
We make novel contributions to the existing lit-
erature on peer effects and the employee welfare
policies of firms. Primarily, we are the first to show
that the employee welfare policies of a firm are
mainly responsive to the policies of their peers and
show that firms do not make their employee wel-
fare policies in isolation. We thus claim that firms’
employee welfare policies are mainly based on
their product market peers. Therefore, this study
contributes to the literature on employee welfare
by showing that peers are among the most im-
portant determinants of a firm’s policies towards
its employees. Secondly, we add to the debate on
peer effects in finance (Chen and Chang, 2019;
Grennan, 2019; John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva,
2011; Leary and Roberts, 2014) by showing that
not only financial policies but also human capital
policies are influenced by the choices of a firm’s
peers. Thirdly, we contribute to the existing litera-
ture on organizational isomorphism (Deephouse,
1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mizruchi and
Fein, 1999; Villadsen, 2013) by showing that the
channels of mimetic and normative isomorphism
drive the mimicking behaviour in firms’ employee
welfare policies. Finally, taking employee welfare
as an important determinant of firm performance,
we examine the economic consequences of follow-
ing peers’ welfare policies and show that following
peers enhances a firm’s value and innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section provides an overview of the exist-
ing literature and develops the research hypothe-
ses. The third section presents the research design,
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data and sample composition. The fourth section
reports and discusses the summary statistics and
main empirical results and findings. The fifth sec-
tion presents several robustness tests, including is-
sues related to endogeneity. The final section con-
cludes the paper by presenting a summary of the
main results, along with the limitations and av-
enues for future research.
Literature and hypothesis development
Employee welfare policy
The human resource theories by Herzberg, Maus-
ner and Snyderman (1959) and Maslow (1943)
view employees as the core assets of a company,
who can add substantial value to the firm through
innovation and client relationships. Skilled human
capital is therefore regarded as a critical input
for innovation. For example, Hall and Bagchi-Sen
(2002) show that skilled employees’ salaries ac-
count for more than 50% of research and develop-
ment (R&D) expenditures. However, the real na-
ture of human capital investment is more about
the treatment of employees in organizations, such
as their participation in decision-making, flexible
working schedules and health and safety (Chen
et al., 2016). As a result, twenty-first-century or-
ganizations not only need to consider the finan-
cial needs of their employees, but also their welfare
and working environment. In this regard, some re-
cent studies’ findings demonstrate that employee
welfare policies positively affect firms’ operational
and financial performance (Edmans, 2011; Ertu-
grul, 2013; Jiao, 2010). Overall, there is a consen-
sus among scholars that companies that invest in
human capital outperform their industry bench-
marks.
The last few years have witnessed a substantial
increase in research on employee welfare and its
impact on firm performance. For example, Ver-
wijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that companies
with a high score in the employee well-being index
have lower debt ratios, and consequently this re-
duces the probability of bankruptcy for these com-
panies. Similarly, Boubaker et al. (2019) demon-
strate that firms devoted to employee well-being
strengthen their relationships with stakeholders
and that such firms prefer long-term debt over and
above short-term debt, which is beneficial in the
long run as it reduces uncertainty and risk. Sim-
ilarly, recent studies suggest that better employee
treatment results in a low probability of default
(Bae, Kang and Wang, 2011), low probability of
misconduct (Zhang, Wang and Kong, 2020), bet-
ter internal control and a low likelihood of finan-
cial restatements (Guo et al., 2016) and reduced
borrowing costs (Chi and Chen, 2020). Overall,
these studies emphasize high employee welfare as
an essential element in a firm’s competitiveness,
not only to beat its peers, but also to retain its
skilled workforce.1
Over the last two decades, the role of peer effects
in corporate decision-making has gained popular-
ity in the management and social sciences litera-
ture.2 In this regard, some recently published stud-
ies have shown peer effects on corporate policies,
such as corporate social responsibility (Husted,
Jamali and Saffar, 2015; Jiraporn et al., 2014),
corporate fraud (Parsons, Sulaeman and Titman,
2018), dividend payouts (Grennan, 2019; John,
Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2011), corporate cash
holdings (Chen and Chang, 2019), risk aversion
and trust (Ahern, Duchin and Shumway, 2014),
accounting restatements (Gleason, Jenkins and
Johnson, 2008), tax avoidance (Li,Winkelman and
D’Amico, 2014) and stock market participation
(Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004), among others.
However, despite a large body of literature on peer
effects and corporate policies, the role of peer ef-
fects in employee welfare policies remains as yet an
unexplored research area.
Mimicking peers in employee welfare policies
can best be described as isomorphism-based or-
ganizational mechanisms. DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) define isomorphism as a ‘constraining pro-
cess that forces one unit in a population to re-
semble other units that face the same set of en-
vironmental conditions’, and identify three main
mechanisms through which isomorphism works:
coercive pressures,mimetic pressures and normative
pressures. Coercive isomorphism refers to the pres-
sure from other organizations on whom the orga-
nization is dependent, or the expectations of the
society/culture in which the organization operates.
These pressures may result from a government’s
1Hale (1998) concludes that 58% of their sample organi-
zations claim to have difficulty retaining their employees.
2See e.g. Adhikari and Agrawal (2018), Bailey et al.
(2018), Brueckner and Largey (2008), Bursztyn et al.
(2014), Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Georgarakos et al.
(2014), Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), Kaus-
tia and Knüpfer (2012), Lundborg (2006), among others.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
4 A. A. Rind et al.
policy change, new legislation, imposition of spe-
cific standard operating procedures, or other envi-
ronmental or social obligations that force firms to
become more homogenous.
Mimetic isomorphism refers to a situationwhere
organizations mimic others in times of uncer-
tainty over technology, goals or policy implica-
tions. When organizations are faced with uncer-
tainty or ambiguous problems, they look at what
others are doing and mimic them. This type of
mimicking may result from three types of imita-
tion: trait-based imitation, frequency-based imita-
tion and outcome-based imitation. In trait-based
imitation, the firm follows the model organiza-
tions that are more successful or have a reputa-
tion in the market (Haunschild and Miner, 1997);
in frequency-based imitation, a firm facing un-
certainty follows the policies adopted by other
firms; while in outcome-based imitation, firms
adopt practices that were successful in the past and
yielded positive results for other firms (Haunschild
and Miner, 1997).
The last mechanism of organizational isomor-
phism is the normative pressures that primarily re-
sult from professionalization. Professionalization
refers to following the standards, norms and prac-
tices collectively issued by member organizations
to determine working conditions and methods in
the field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is
compelling for organizations to adopt industry
norms and standards in their policymaking.
The main focus of this paper is based on exam-
ining the mimetic pressure of organizational iso-
morphism, as peer following in corporate policies
is linked tomainly information (trait and outcome-
based imitation by following firms with a high rep-
utation or firms with high success) and compe-
tition (frequency)-based motives (Lieberman and
Asaba, 2006). Employee welfare can be linked to
mimetic pressure, as firms follow others to be com-
petitive or improve their reputation and learn from
others. Therefore, we argue that, despite the sub-
stantial amount of research contributions in this
area, which cover different aspects of employee
welfare policies and related issues, previous studies
have not yet explored the influence of peer effects
on the employee welfare policies of organizations.
This paper addresses this research gap and investi-
gates firms’ peer effects on their employee welfare
policies. While doing so, we examine the mimetic
channel of isomorphism and shed light on the role
of coercive and normative pressures in driving em-
ployee welfare policies.
Hypothesis development
According to the human resource theory, firms
give special attention to human capital investment3
and regard employee welfare as one of the most
important channels to maximize the benefits from
that investment. In line with the human capital
investment theory and labour retention perspec-
tive of Hale (1998), one can assume that peer ef-
fects play a crucial role in firms’ employee wel-
fare policies. Our argument is based on the model
of conformity by Bernheim (1994), which sug-
gests that people may desire to keep the same con-
sumption level as that which is mutual in their so-
cial group. Hence, socially tied individuals to the
reference group may want to have the same em-
ployment benefits as the reference group. More-
over, evidence in previous literature suggests that
economic agents follow their peers by observing
other agents’ choices, obtained through social in-
teraction, rather than using their own information,
without knowing the costs and benefits of alter-
native choices.4 Thus, we posit that similar mim-
icking is possible in employee welfare policies and
propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms’ employee welfare policies are posi-
tively associated with the welfare policies of
their peer organizations.
Managers’ reputational concerns in the labour
market also force them to adopt similar employee
welfare policies as their competitors, irrespective
of whether such policies maximize shareholder
wealth. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that
managers follow others while ignoring their pri-
vate information and consider it rational because
of reputational concerns. Accordingly, the result-
ing unprofitable decisions are not as bad for the
managers’ reputation if others are also doing it, as
3See Cao, Liang and Zhan (2019), Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2009), John and Kadyrzhanova (2008), Knyazeva and
Knyazeva (2012), Liu and Wu (2016), among others.
4For example, Banerjee (1992) observes that people do
what others do rather than using their own information.
Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) argue that economic agents
rely on the information obtained via social interaction
and make decisions on the basis of that information.
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they will share the blame if a failure occurs. Cheva-
lier and Ellison (1999) examine reputational herd-
ing in their work on the labour market for mutual
fund managers, and find evidence suggesting that
young managers are more likely to be punished
when they deviate from the herd and less likely to
be punished when they follow their senior coun-
terparts. Similarly, Leary and Roberts (2014) ar-
gue that the fundamental channel behind herding
is not irrational following but due to information
or incentive distortion or limited cognitive abilities
of the manager. Furthermore, Banerjee (1992) ar-
gues that managers tend to ignore their own infor-
mation and follow other managers.
In line with the above arguments, reputational
herdingmay be one of the reasonswhy firms follow
their peers. Moreover, managers may lack specific
expertise, knowledge or skills, or they might per-
ceive that they are less informed than their industry
peers, due to which they follow other firms. This
argument is validated by the research findings of
Leary and Roberts (2014), who suggest that herd-
ing behaviour is mainly due to reputational and
learning models, and argue that the fundamental
mechanism behind herding is not irrational follow-
ing but information or incentive distortion, or lim-
ited cognitive abilities of the manager. We there-
fore propose our second research hypothesis as fol-
lows:
H2: There is a leader–follower relationship in em-
ployee welfare policies wherein follower firms
mimic the leaders’ employee welfare policies.
Likewise, the competitive labour market model
based on Hale (1998) stresses that firms are forced
to offer market-based compensation and other
benefits for the sake of retaining their skilled work-
force. Since we proxy peers through product mar-
ket competition, similar skills are required in each
product market; hence, employees may voluntar-
ily quit and join other product market peers with
better employment prospects and benefits if not
satisfied with their current employer. Several costs
are associated with this turnover, including sepa-
ration cost, loss of productivity, replacement costs
– such as advertising and recruiting new person-
nel, administration costs, training and develop-
ment costs and loss of knowledge capital (Dalton,
Todor and Krackhardt, 1982; Harris, Tang and
Tseng, 2002; Hom and Griffeth, 1995; Smith and
Watkins, 1978; Tracey and Hinkin, 2006). Indeed,
Wright and Bonett (2007) find that employee well-
being reduces turnover; thus, to save this huge cost,
firmsmay be forced to provide similar incentives as
offered by their product market peers.
A firm’s adoption of employee welfare policies
can affect its peer firms in the labour market com-
petition, which may force them to respond by im-
proving their own employee welfare policies. For
example, a firm can adopt an employee-friendly
workplace policy that develops a tolerance for fail-
ure and positively affects the employee’s engage-
ment, thus improving the firm’s innovation (Chen
et al., 2016). As a firm becomes the first mover in
the industry to adopt such a workplace policy, it
can gain a competitive advantage in the product
market through innovation; subsequently, other
firms will follow the earlier firm to gain compet-
itive advantage through improving the workplace
and employee welfare.
Thus, the competitive labour market may force
firms to provide market-based compensation and
other benefits to retain skilled labour, as it is chal-
lenging to do so in today’s competitive business
environment (Hale, 1998). Moreover, according to
Seldon and Sowa (2015), employee turnover cost
is about 50–200% of employee annual salaries,
which forces firms to provide benefits equivalent
to their competitors and peers to retain skilled
labour. Therefore, it is expected that peer following
in employee welfare and well-being is stronger in
highly competitivemarkets. In line with these argu-
ments, we posit our third hypothesis as follows:
H3: Peer following in employee welfare policy is
stronger in highly competitive markets.
Research design, data and sample
composition
Employee welfare index
Wemeasure employee welfare through the Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD)
database, which measures firms’ CSR attributes
based on seven dimensions: community, diversity,
employee relations, environment, product, human
rights and corporate governance, for various in-
dices (e.g. S&P500 Index, Domino Index (DS 400),
as well as 3000 largest public companies by market
capitalization).
Following previous studies (e.g. Ghaly, Dang
and Stathopoulos, 2015; Landier, Nair and Wulf,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
6 A. A. Rind et al.
2009; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010), we also
exploit employee relations data from the KLD
database as a proxy for employee welfare, be-
cause the use of this database to measure em-
ployee welfare has several advantages. For exam-
ple, this database uses multiple pre-specified cri-
teria to measure each dimension, allowing vari-
ous aspects of that dimension to be covered. Sode-
man (1995) mentions that it is far more specific
than the Fortune rankings, with an enriched mea-
surement along with a number of widely used
social-investment criteria. Further, this database’s
coverage is comprehensive and includes multiple
stakeholders and annualized longitudinal assess-
ments (Ruf, Muralidhar and Paul, 1998). Due to
its relative advantages, academic research widely
uses this database to examine a firm’s relations
with its employees (Bae, Kang and Wang, 2011).
The employee relations dimension of KLD assigns
a strength score to each firm annually based on
parameters of union relations, employee involve-
ment policies, retirement benefit strengths, profit-
sharing programmes, health and safety standards
and other strengths. The weakness score dimen-
sions include union relations, workforce reduc-
tion, health and safety standards, retirement ben-
efit concerns and other weaknesses. The details of
each parameter are defined in Appendix A.
We use all US firms in the KLD stats database
over 1996–2017 as our initial sample. After merg-
ing this data with Compustat using the global
company key (GVKEY), we obtain the final sam-
ple of 11,451 firm-year observations. The most
widely used proxy for employee relations is the net
score obtained by summing the strengths score and
subtracting the aggregate concerns score to arrive
at the net score for each year. Ghaly, Dang and
Stathopoulos (2015) and Verwijmeren and Der-
wall (2010) used this measure as a proxy for em-
ployee well-being in their studies, as follows:






where Emp_wel f arei,t = employee welfare score
for firm i in year t;
∑
Strengthi,t = sum of
strengths for firm i in year t;
∑
Weaknessi,t = sum
of weaknesses/concerns for firm i in year t.
However, Mǎnescu (2011) argues that this ap-
proach lacks comparability, as strength and con-
cerns vary across time and dimensions for al-
most all the KLD indicators, except product safety
and environmental dimensions. Hence, we also use
his proposed measure by taking average strengths
and then subtracting average weaknesses to obtain
the net average score per year for the employee
relations dimension, illustrated by the following
equation:









where Avg_Emp_wel f arei,t is the annual average
employee welfare score for firm i; ui,t is the num-
ber of strengths for firm i in year t; ki,t is the num-





Weaknessi,t remain the same, as defined in
Equation (1).
Table 1 presents the year-wise breakdown of
the employee welfare score over the period from
1996 to 2017. The data in Table 1 shows that the
average employee welfare score for our sample is
0.063. Moreover, about 61% of the firm-year ob-
servations in our sample have zero employee wel-
fare scores, 19.30% have negative employee welfare
scores and 19.20% have positive employee welfare
scores. Table 1 also documents that the summary
statistics of our sample’s employee welfare score
are slightly higher than those of previous stud-
ies (Ghaly, Dang and Stathopoulos, 2015; Verwi-
jmeren and Derwall, 2010).
Proxies for peers
We use the TNIC developed by Hoberg and
Phillips (2016) as a proxy for peer firms.5 This
measure uses the number of common words in a
firm’s product description to describe its industry
and ranges from 0% to 100%. Foucault and Fre-
sard (2014) highlight three essential features of this
measure. Firstly, unlike SIC or NAICS, it changes
over time as the firm modifies its product line, so
our proxy measures the real-time peers, hence re-
ducing the selection bias in our sample. Secondly,
firms with the same TNIC are exposed to com-
mon shocks because of the similarity in products
they supply to the market. This is not possible
5Data is available at http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/
industryclass.html.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of employee welfare scores




percentile 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
99th
percentile
1996 118 1.03% 0.220 0.859 −2 0 0 1 2
1997 125 1.09% 0.376 0.930 −2 0 0 1 3
1998 131 1.14% 0.473 0.923 −1 0 0 1 3
1999 132 1.15% 0.538 0.911 −1 0 0 1 3
2000 145 1.27% 0.572 0.977 −1 0 1 1 3
2001 232 2.03% 0.233 0.891 −1 0 0 1 3
2002 245 2.14% 0.196 0.959 −2 0 0 1 3
2003 709 6.19% −0.173 0.725 −2 −1 0 0 2
2004 723 6.31% −0.225 0.829 −2 −1 0 0 2
2005 712 6.22% −0.288 0.871 −2 −1 0 0 2
2006 687 6.00% −0.298 0.894 −2 −1 0 0 2
2007 702 6.13% −0.283 0.954 −3 −1 0 0 2
2008 729 6.37% −0.251 0.976 −3 −1 0 0 3
2009 754 6.58% −0.276 0.970 −3 −1 0 0 3
2010 766 6.69% −0.064 0.621 −2 0 0 0 2
2011 738 6.44% −0.016 0.602 −2 0 0 0 2
2012 727 6.35% 0.551 1.330 −1 0 0 0 5
2013 675 5.89% 0.718 1.232 −1 0 0 1 5
2014 684 5.97% 0.231 0.554 −1 0 0 0 3
2015 637 5.56% 0.394 0.779 −1 0 0 1 4
2016 573 5.00% 0.413 0.803 0 0 0 1 3
2017 507 4.43% 0.278 0.551 0 0 0 0 2
Total 11,451 100% 0.063 0.946 −2 0 0 0 3
This table reports summary statistics of employee welfare score, where the sample contains 11,451 firm-year observations over the
period between 1996 and 2017.
when firms are defined based on production pro-
cesses. Lastly, each firm has its own separate peer
group because of the relativity in defining industry
members. Thus, all the above characteristics make
TNIC peers a robust measure for defining the peer
firms based on a firm’s product description in its
10-K filings, as using TNICs to define peers cre-
ates a unique set of peers for each firm that can
change over time based on the changes in the firm’s
product description. While our main analysis uses
TNIC-based peers, we also run a robustness test
using peers based on the Fama and French 48-
industry classification.
Control variables
Following Brockman, Luo and Xu (2020), we con-
trol for different firm-level characteristics, com-
prising long-term debt to total assets (Leverage),
natural log of total assets (Size), return on as-
sets (ROA), market to book ratio (MTB), dividend
dummy, tangibility, pension expenses per worker,
R&D intensity, sales growth and number of em-
ployees. The description of the variables and data
sources is included in Appendix B.
Empirical model
As the firm’s peer effects operate through two dif-
ferent channels, actions and characteristics, it is
difficult to empirically identify such effects, mainly
because of the ‘reflection’ problem (Manski,
1993). Differentiating between the two channels
also poses identification problems, which Manski
(1993) overcomes by bifurcating the action-based
peer effects from characteristic-based peer effects.
We also use a similar strategy in our empirical
model. Specifically, we include peer firm average
characteristics and control, or firm-level character-
istics, through the following empirical model:
yi,j,t = βy−i,j,t + γ ′X−i,j,t + λ′Xi,j,t + δ′μj
+ φνt + εi, j,t (3)
where i, j, t refer to firm, industry and year, re-
spectively; yi,j,t refers to the employee welfare score
of the firm computed from Equations (1) and (2);
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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deviation 1% 5% Q1 Median Q3 95% 99%
Dependent variable
Emp. Welfare 11,451 0.063 0.947 −2.000 −1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 3.000
Emp. Welfare2 11,451 0.005 0.201 −0.500 −0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.6666667
Independent variable
Peer Emp. Welfare 11,451 0.073 0.599 −1.333 −1.000 −0.206 0.000 0.333 1.000 2.000
Peer Emp. Welfare2 11,451 0.007 0.131 −0.333 −0.200 −0.053 0.000 0.067 0.214 0.393
Firm-specific factors
MTB 11,451 3.154 2.941 −0.553 0.633 1.438 2.303 3.738 8.693 16.779
ROA 11,451 6.910 9.497 −23.906 −6.441 0.078 6.890 12.590 22.739 31.332
Leverage 11,451 11.990 15.811 0.000 0.000 0.037 2.907 20.745 45.272 64.697
Size 11,451 7.207 1.639 4.226 4.808 5.950 7.044 8.255 10.246 11.579
Tangibility 11,451 16.936 17.675 0.026 0.072 2.756 11.670 25.398 56.047 75.359
Dividend dummy 11,451 0.449 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pension per worker 11,451 2.065 2.411 −0.976 0.000 0.466 1.359 2.763 6.702 13.554
Research intensity 11,451 0.215 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.061 0.255 0.948 1.984
Sales growth 11,451 9.740 20.765 −32.457 −15.336 0.000 4.681 15.646 48.273 99.493
Employees 11,451 2.511 1.749 −1.120 −0.224 1.218 2.514 3.708 5.443 6.580
Peer firm averages for control variables
MTB 11,451 3.183 1.926 0.544 1.039 2.043 2.818 3.817 6.308 10.702
ROA 11,451 6.722 6.135 −3.693 −0.034 0.227 6.656 10.700 16.917 23.615
Leverage 11,451 11.639 11.009 0.000 0.098 2.180 8.834 17.702 32.466 48.617
Size 11,451 7.216 1.122 4.999 5.718 6.426 7.009 7.920 9.291 10.401
Tangibility 11,451 16.759 15.452 0.059 0.099 6.092 12.932 24.275 50.080 65.515
Dividend dummy 11,451 0.437 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.333 0.750 1.000 1.000
Pension per worker 11,451 0.238 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.094 0.410 0.834 1.300
Research intensity 11,451 10.148 13.191 −20.172 −5.874 0.107 8.127 18.446 32.441 46.078
Sales growth 11,451 2.055 1.815 −0.036 0.185 0.958 1.650 2.620 5.372 9.276
Employees 11,451 2.505 1.293 0.071 0.653 1.427 2.435 3.492 4.650 5.508
This table reports the summary statistics of all regression variables. Dependent variables are the measure of employee welfare based
on KLD data. Data contains 11,451 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2017 with the matched control variables. Peer firm averages
represent variables constructed as the average of firms within TNIC-based industry-year combinations, excluding the ith observation.
Firm-specific factors represent the variables corresponding to firm i’s value in year t. Appendices A and B provide detailed descriptions
of all the variables.
ȳ−i,j,t refers to the average employee welfare score
of industry peers based on the firm’s TNIC-based
peers, excluding firm i; X̄−i,j,t andXi,j,t refer to peer
firms’ averages based on TNIC peers (excluding
firm i) for each control variable and firm-specific
characteristic, respectively; δ′μj and νt refer to in-
dustry and year fixed effects, respectively; and εi,j,t
is the firm-year-specific error term. We are inter-
ested in the coefficients β and γ ′ that explain the




Table 2 presents summary statistics for our sam-
ple of 11,451 firm-year observations containing
1,487 unique firms. All financial variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to lessen the
impact of extreme observations and remove any
data coding errors. Like Leary and Roberts (2014),
variables are grouped into peer firm averages and
firm-specific factors. The first category comprises
the average of all firms in an industry-year com-
bination, excluding the ith observation. The sec-
ond category comprises firm i’s value at time t.
Our employee welfare variable mean and stan-
dard deviation values of 0.063 and 0.947 are rel-
atively comparable to previous literature (Ghaly,
Dang and Stathopoulos, 2015; Verwijmeren and
Derwall, 2010) using the KLD employee welfare
score in their research. Moreover, the sample con-
sists of relatively large firms, as measured using
the natural logarithm of total assets with a mean
value of 7.207 compared to the median value of
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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7.044. Other control variables are relatively similar
to those reported by Ghaly, Dang and Stathopou-
los (2015).
Table 3 highlights a few important results from
the pairwise correlation matrix of all the variables
used in our analysis. Firstly, our employee welfare
variable is significantly related to the TNIC-based
peers’ average employee welfare score (pairwise
correlation of 0.628), which gives a preliminary
assurance of our main hypothesis’s validity. Sec-
ondly, none of our control variables are highly cor-
related with our main independent variable, which
provides some assurance that multicollinearity is
not a severe issue. To further check whether these
variables are collinear, we perform the variance in-
flation factor (VIF) test. Our VIF tests are consid-
erably lower in untabulated results than the stan-
dard threshold limit of five (Choi et al., 2012;
Montgomery and Peck, 1982) for all our regres-
sion variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is
not a problem in our sample.
Peer effects in employee welfare
This section reports the result of the regression
models to examine the peer effects in firms’ em-
ployee welfare policies. Table 4 shows the result of
multivariate regressions after controlling for vari-
ous peer and firm characteristics. In all the models
in Table 4, the dependent variable is calculated as
in Equation (1), while the variable of interest and
other peer averages are calculated based on TNIC-
based peers. All firm-specific characteristics repre-
sent the values of firm i at year t. The results show
that our variable of interest is positively significant
at the 1% level in specifications (columns 1 to 4) in
Table 4, which strongly supports ourH1 that firms
do follow their peers in adopting employee welfare
policies. The results are persistent after controlling
not only for peer average and firm-specific char-
acteristics, but also industry and year fixed effects.
These results also support the labour retention per-
spective of Hale (1998) and the social group per-
spective of Bernheim (1994).
Using OLS regression in column 1, we find a sig-
nificant positive relationship between a firm’s em-
ployee welfare policy and its TNIC-based peers’
welfare policies in the presence of all the con-
trol variables and controlling for industry and year
fixed effects. Most of the control variables also
show significance with the firm’s employee welfare
policy. The results in column 1 also reveal that the
effect of other peer characteristics on a firm’s em-
ployee welfare policies is significant (except mar-
ket to book, sales growth and peers’ average em-
ployees), indicating that these peer characteristics
also influence firms’ employee welfare policies in
addition to peer employee welfare, thus validat-
ing the argument of Manski (1993) that peer ef-
fects operate through both actions and characteris-
tics. However, all three characteristics, as described
above (market to book, sales growth and peers’
average employees), are less significant compared
to peer firms’ employee welfare policies, as can be
seen by the t-statistics and coefficients in column
1 of Table 4, suggesting that the principal chan-
nel through which peer firms may impact a firm’s
employee welfare policies is through action (peer
employee welfare), rather than characteristics.
To further validate our results, we use alter-
nate estimation techniques in columns 2–4. Specif-
ically, we use Newey–West and Prais–Winsten es-
timation techniques in columns 2 and 3, respec-
tively, to overcome any autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity in the error terms in the model.
In contrast, in column 4 we utilize weighted least
squares estimation, where the weight is the inverse
of the yearly observations per industry (where the
industry is defined based on Fama and French’s
48-industry classification). Our results are positive
and statistically significant in all alternate speci-
fications from columns 2–4, providing strong evi-
dence of peer effects in the firm’s employee welfare
policies. Thus, alternative estimation techniques
strongly support H1. Nonetheless, most of the
control (firm-specific) variables’ results are con-
sistent with those obtained in earlier studies (e.g.
Brockman, Luo and Xu, 2020).
Who mimics who?
Leaders versus followers. This section empirically
testsH2 regarding the leader–follower relationship
in the firm’s employee welfare mimicking policy.
Specifically, we examine whether non-successful
companies follow successful ones due to reputa-
tion (but not vice versa). To empirically investi-
gate this issue, we divide our sample into three
groups based on various success measures: market
share, firm age and profitability. Based on Leary
and Roberts (2014), we define leaders (followers)
as those in the top (bottom)-third ranking within
each year based on the above measures.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Multivariate regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS Newey–West Prais–Winsten WLS
Peer Emp. Welfare 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.814*** 0.962***
(40.27) (51.46) (35.72) (65.93)
MTB 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.66) (0.87) (0.81) (0.65)
ROA 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(5.82) (7.77) (6.18) (9.64)
Leverage −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.004***
(−4.04) (−5.42) (−3.10) (−5.83)
Size 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.128*** 0.151***
(5.41) (8.14) (5.47) (9.29)
Tangibility 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(3.63) (5.21) (3.47) (6.79)
Dividend dummy 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.102*** 0.106***
(2.67) (3.90) (3.23) (4.98)
Pension per worker 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.015** 0.025***
(2.64) (3.88) (2.22) (5.46)
Research intensity 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.171*** 0.231***
(3.66) (4.93) (3.47) (6.43)
Sales growth −0.001* −0.001** −0.001*** −0.001**
(−1.84) (−1.99) (−2.89) (−2.33)
Employees −0.011 −0.011 0.000 −0.011
(−0.41) (−0.59) (0.02) (−0.66)
Peer_MTB −0.010 −0.010* −0.007 −0.009
(−1.49) (−1.68) (−1.24) (−1.56)
Peer_ROA −0.009*** −0.009*** −0.008*** −0.009***
(−3.72) (−4.34) (−3.83) (−4.40)
Peer_Leverage 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.004***
(2.68) (3.30) (1.80) (3.24)
Peer_Size −0.166*** −0.166*** −0.112*** −0.154***
(−4.53) (−6.27) (−4.04) (−6.13)
Peer_Tangibility −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.004*** −0.006***
(−3.23) (−4.47) (−2.75) (−5.07)
Peer_Dividend dummy −0.110** −0.110*** −0.102** −0.106***
(−2.20) (−2.82) (−2.58) (−2.86)
Peer_Pension per worker −0.019* −0.019** −0.008 −0.018**
(−1.69) (−2.32) (−0.99) (−2.48)
Peer_Research intensity −0.247*** −0.247*** −0.159** −0.241***
(−2.77) (−3.53) (−2.34) (−4.14)
Peer_Sales growth 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002*
(1.61) (1.76) (1.33) (1.88)
Peer_Employees 0.020 0.020 0.027 0.018
(0.54) (0.76) (0.98) (0.71)
Constant 0.113 0.113 −0.022 0.568
(0.62) (0.80) (−0.13) (0.86)
Observations 11,451 11,451 11,451 11,451
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R square/F statistics 0.476 1662*** 0.369 0.485
This table reports the result of our main regression for employee welfare and the industry employee welfare score measure based on
annual average using Text-basedNetwork Industrial Classification (TNIC). The dependent and independent variables are net employee
welfare score and industry-level employee welfare score in all the models, respectively. Peer firm averages represent variables constructed
as the average of firms within TNIC-based industry-year combinations, excluding the ith observation. Firm-specific factors represent
the variables corresponding to firm i’s value in year t. Appendices A and B provide detailed descriptions of all the variables. *, ** and
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5. Who mimics who?




share firms Young firms Small firms
Lagged Peer Emp. Welfare remaining sample 0.051*** 0.059* 0.042*
(3.05) (1.82) (1.73)
Lagged peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Lagged firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,872 4,036 2,929
R square 0.208 0.259 0.213




share firms Old firms Large firms
Peer Emp. Welfare remaining sample 0.063 0.041 0.077
(0.84) (0.97) (1.22)
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,688 3,149 3,435
R square 0.352 0.275 0.311
Panel C: Competition and employee welfare peer effects
(1) (2)
Variables Low competition High competition





Firm-specific factors Yes Yes
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes
Firm cluster effect Yes Yes
R square 0.586 0.469
This table presents the reaction of followers and leaders towards the rest of the sample firms. The dependent variable in all the regres-
sions is the firm’s employee welfare score. The independent variable in Panel A (Panel B) is peer firms’ average employee welfare score,
except for the followers (leaders), where peers are defined based on the Fama and French 48-industry classification. Followers (leaders)
are defined as those having a bottom (top)-third ranking within the year based on market share, firm age and firm size. In Panel C, we
divide firms into low (high) competition based on the annual industry median based on product-market fluidity. Lower (higher) values
of product market competition correspond to low (high) competition. Firm-specific factors represent the variables corresponding to
firm i’s value in year t. Appendices A and B provide detailed descriptions of all the variables. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6. Robustness tests




















Peer Emp. Welfare2 0.982*** – – – – –
(47.33) – – – – –
Peer Emp. Welfare – 0.971*** 0.141*** 0.534*** 0.762*** 1.018***
– (38.87) (2.72) (18.49) (28.71) (33.12)
MTB 0.000 0.002 −0.002 0.004 0.002 −0.006
(0.39) (0.31) (−0.44) (0.81) (0.53) (−0.63)
ROA 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.020***
(5.88) (6.36) (6.89) (5.47) (4.26) (5.96)
Leverage −0.001*** −0.004*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.000 −0.008***
(−3.72) (−3.91) (−5.13) (−4.38) (−0.49) (−3.88)
Size 0.031*** 0.178*** 0.148*** 0.183*** 0.053 0.234***
(5.02) (5.94) (5.35) (5.56) (1.25) (3.89)
Tangibility 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.014***
(3.71) (3.43) (2.74) (3.51) (2.15) (4.33)
Dividend dummy 0.020** 0.134*** 0.076* 0.091* 0.101** 0.107
(2.36) (3.32) (1.94) (1.85) (2.25) (1.38)
Pension per worker 0.005** 0.015 0.012 0.028** 0.006 0.046**
(2.33) (1.56) (1.48) (2.37) (0.75) (2.42)
Research intensity 0.039*** 0.215*** 0.317*** 0.249*** 0.154** 0.525***
(3.16) (3.44) (5.60) (3.62) (2.26) (4.05)
Sales growth −0.000 −0.001* −0.001*** −0.001 −0.001** −0.002**
(−1.40) (−1.67) (−2.98) (−1.02) (−2.36) (−2.18)
Employees −0.009 −0.018 −0.009 −0.013 0.011 −0.042
(−1.61) (−0.64) (−0.38) (−0.42) (0.26) (−0.71)
Constant 0.046 0.090 −1.147* −0.028 −0.037 −0.694*
(1.18) (0.49) (−1.84) (−0.11) (−0.80) (−1.81)
Observations 11,451 9,266 11,337 9,408 9,408 4,407
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R square 0.487 0.482 0.285 0.361 0.317 0.681
This table reports the robustness of our main regression for employee welfare and industry employee welfare. In column 1, we redefine
our dependent variable as the average employee welfare score calculated based on Equation (2) and calculate our independent variable
as the industry-level employee welfare score based on TNIC peers. In column 2, we exclude the crisis period and rerun our baseline
model using the net employee welfare score and its peer averages as a dependent, and independent, variable respectively. In column
3, we redefine the peer firms based on the Fama and French 48-industry classification and calculate the main independent variable as
the average employee welfare score of FF 48-industry peers, excluding firm i. In column 4, we rerun our baseline model using the net
employee welfare score and lagged TNIC-based peer averages for our main independent and control variables. In column 5, we use the
first differences of dependent, independent, control and their peer averages and rerun our baseline model. Lastly, in column 6, we drop
the employee welfare score that equals 0 and rerun our baseline model. Appendices A and B provide a detailed description of all the
variables. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
We run a regression for the subsample of follow-
ers (the bottom third of the total sample) where
the dependent variable is the followers’ employee
welfare score. The independent variable is the av-
erage employee welfare score of the rest of the
sample, excluding the followers’ average employee
welfare score. The idea here is to see whether fol-
lowers mimic the policies of their counterparts, or
otherwise. The results are reported in Panel A of
Table 5. We find that followers – as defined by
those that lie in the bottom third of the sample
based on market share, firm age and profitability –
mimic the behaviour of the rest of the firms in the
sample.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 7. Instrumental variable analysis
(1) (2) (3)
2SLS GMM
Variables Peer employee welfare Employee welfare Employee welfare
State welfare instrument 0.009* – –
(1.69) – –
Peer Emp. Welfare (instrumented) – 3.131* 0.903***
– (1.79) (65.12)
Lagged Emp. Welfare – – 0.375***
– – (56.80)
MTB −0.003 0.010 0.014***
(−1.48) (1.49) (6.65)
ROA −0.000 0.010*** 0.001
(−0.22) (6.60) (1.38)
Leverage −0.000 −0.004*** −0.002***
(−1.10) (−3.16) (−4.56)
Size −0.022*** 0.216*** 0.225***
(−2.78) (4.69) (14.78)
Tangibility −0.000 0.005*** 0.001**
(−0.04) (3.92) (2.55)
Dividend dummy −0.032*** 0.161** 0.050***
(−2.79) (2.52) (2.88)
Pension per worker 0.006** 0.017 0.006**
(2.21) (1.37) (2.25)
Research intensity 0.013 0.186*** 0.230***
(0.72) (3.29) (6.21)
Sales growth 0.000 −0.001* −0.001**
(0.38) (−1.85) (−2.51)
Employees 0.031*** −0.088 −0.136***
(3.82) (−1.47) (−8.53)
Constant −1.213*** 2.728 0.089
(−17.33) (1.31) (1.58)
Observations 9,750 9,750 7,683
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
F test of the excluded instruments 2.86* – –
Under-identification test 2.87* – –
F statistics/Wald chi square – 44.05*** 9.09***
Sargan (p-value) – – 0.703
AR(1) test (p-value) – – 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) – – 0.353
This table presents instrumental variable (2SLS) results, dynamicGMMestimated coefficients and t (z) statistics. The dependent variable
is indicated at the top of each column. The instrument is the state welfare index composed by taking the average of firm i’s TNIC-based
nonlocal peer firms’ state welfare score. Peer firm averages represent variables constructed as the average of firms within TNIC-based
industry-year combinations, excluding the ith firm. Firm-specific factors represent the variables corresponding to firm i’s value in year t.
AppendicesA andBprovide detailed descriptions of all the variables. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
We also run a regression for the subsample
of leaders (the top third of the total sample)
where the dependent variable is the leaders’ em-
ployee welfare score, and the independent vari-
able is the average employee welfare score of the
rest of the sample, excluding the leaders’ average
employee welfare score. The idea here is to see
whether leaders mimic the policies of their fol-
lower peers. The results are reported in Panel B
of Table 5. Interestingly, we do not see any herd-
ing or mimicking behaviour across high market
cap firms, old firms and large firms. These results
help us understand that followers mimic the em-
ployee welfare policies of other peers. However,
leaders’ employee welfare policies are insensitive
to similar policies of other peer firms, thus val-
idating our reputational-based herding hypothe-
sis (H2). Overall, these results strongly support
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 8. Channels of peer effects in employee welfare
Coercive pressure Mimetic pressure Normative
pressure

















State_welfare 0.008 – – – –
(0.60) – – – –
Peers_inside_State – −0.039 – – –
– (−1.52) – – –
Peer Emp. Welfare – – 1.033*** 0.652*** –
– – (22.40) (13.66) –
Peer Emp. Welfare*TNIC HHI – – −0.156* – –
– – (−1.69) – –
TNIC HHI – – 0.057 – –
– – (1.02) – –
Peer Emp. Welfare*Analyst coverage – – – 0.022*** –
– – – (7.93) –
Analyst coverage – – – 0.008*** –
– – – (3.16) –
Welfare_Fortune_Peers – – – – 0.734***
– – – – (6.13)
Constant −0.173 −0.737** 0.010 −0.130 0.113
(−0.68) (−2.54) (0.07) (−0.65) (0.36)
Observations 11,410 7,733 4,870 4,870 8,375
Firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R square 0.289 0.274 0.586 0.469 0.27
This table examines the channels of peer effects in employee welfare policy. Columns 1 and 2 examine the coercive pressure channel
wherein the firm’s employee welfare policy is regressed on state-level welfare and TNIC peers inside the state, respectively. Columns
3–6 examine the mimetic pressure through a low and high level of competition and information asymmetry (IA). Low and high values
are based on the annual industry median based on product-market fluidity (for competition) and analyst forecast dispersion (IA).
Higher (lower) values of product market competition (analyst forecast dispersion) correspond to high (low) competition (IA). Column
7 reports the results for normative pressure by using the welfare scores of TNIC peers that are in the list of 100 best companies to work
for. The list is published every year by Fortune magazine. Appendices A and B provide detailed descriptions of all the variables. *, **
and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
the reputation-based herding behaviour and are
in line with Leary and Roberts (2014), who show
that firms follow their peers due to reputational
concerns.
High versus low competition. Next, we examine
the competition channel by dividing our firms
into low and high-competition samples using the
product market fluidity as the proxy for compe-
tition. Hoberg and Phillips (2016) propose that
product market fluidity measures the competitive
threats of rival firms. The proxy measures the
similarity of words between the firm’s and its ri-
vals’ products, taken from the product descrip-
tion in its 10-K filings, which varies yearly as the
firm changes its product line. Based on the prod-
uct market fluidity, firms below (above) the an-
nual median observations are classified as fac-
ing low (high) competition. We run separate re-
gressions on both the subsamples and report the
results in Panel C of Table 5. We find strong
peer effects in the firms’ employee welfare policies,
irrespective of product market competition in-
tensity. The results also highlight an important
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Table 9. Economic consequence of peer following in employee welfare (2SLS)
Tobin’s Q Innovation














Peer Emp. Welfare 0.983*** – 1.043*** – 1.046*** –
(64.56) – (53.63) – (38.52) –
Emp. Welfare (instrumented) – 0.033* – 0.264*** – 0.207***
– (1.71) – (8.33) – (3.92)
Constant 0.032 2.021*** 0.089 0.009 0.005 2.471***
(0.76) (14.28) (0.58) (2.19) (0.03) (6.24)
Observations 10470 10470 6561 6561 3610 3610
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer averages of firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R square 0.453 0.608 0.466 0.487 0.413 0.546
This table presents the two-stage least square regression estimating the relationship between employee welfare and firm value and
innovation. In the first-stage regression, the dependent variable is the firm’s Emp. Welfare and the independent variable is peer Emp.
Welfare, wherein peers are based on TNIC classification. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the first and second-stage regression
of two-stage least squares (2SLS), estimating the relationship between employee welfare and firm value using peer Emp. Welfare as an
instrument for the firm’sEmp.Welfare. In the second-stage regression, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and the independent variable
is instrumented employee welfare from the first-stage regression. Columns 3–6 report similar 2SLS regression, wherein we analyse the
impact of the firm’s employee welfare policy on its innovation through the number of patents and citations, respectively. Appendices
A and B provide detailed descriptions of all the variables. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
finding that firms do not follow others in employee
welfare only to gain a competitive advantage or re-
duce costs. These results also support our previ-
ous finding on reputation-based herding as these
unprofitable decisions are not as bad for the man-
agers’ reputations if others are also doing it, as
they share the blame in the case of failure (Scharf-
stein and Stein, 1990).
Robustness tests
This section reports several robustness tests that
further validate our previous results regarding the
role of peer effects in corporate employee welfare
policies. In line with previous studies, including
that of Mǎnescu (2011), we use average employee
welfare scores as our alternative dependent vari-
able for the sensitivity checks. Table 6 reports the
results of regressions using the average employee
welfare score as a proxy for employee welfare. In
column 1 of Table 6, we repeat the same regres-
sion as in column 1 of Table 4, with the alternative
proxy for employee welfare, but our results remain
consistent in all regression specifications, showing
positive and significant peer effects in firms’ em-
ployee welfare policies.
We then changed the sample composition in col-
umn 2 by excluding the financial crisis period of
2008–2009 to see whether this event drives our
results or not. The results suggest that excluding
the crisis period from our analysis does not affect
our main conclusions, and the results for peer ef-
fect in employee welfare remain significant at the
1% level. Using TNIC to define peers is a proxy
that reduces many modelling and technical er-
rors as defined above; however, to further validate
our results, we also utilize Fama and French’s 48-
industry classification to define peer firms. Many
previous studies, including Beatty, Liao and Yu
(2013) and Leary and Roberts (2014), among oth-
ers, have utilized this proxy to define peer firms.
Column 3 of Table 6 reports the results of re-
gressions using the net employee welfare score as
defined in Equation (1), where peers are defined
based onFama andFrench’s 48-industry classifica-
tion. Again, the results show a significant and pos-
itive association between the firm’s employee wel-
fare policies and that of its peers.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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In order to avoid the concerns of reverse causal-
ity and simultaneity bias, we lag our main inde-
pendent and control variables in column 4 of Ta-
ble 6. Our main conclusion again remains quali-
tatively unchanged. We also apply change regres-
sions to see whether changes in the dependent
variable (net employee welfare score) are associ-
atedwith changes in the independent variable (peer
firms’ average employee welfare score). We control
for time-invariant firm-specific unobservable char-
acteristics by applying this regression technique,
which reduces endogeneity biases in our analysis.
Tomitigate the correlated omitted variable bias, we
run change regressions by using the first difference
of all the model variables in column 5 of Table 6;
yet this does not affect our main conclusion, as our
main variable of interest remains significant at the
1% threshold level, concluding that omitted vari-
able bias does not drive our main conclusion.
Lastly, we address the issue that more than 60%
of observations have a zero net welfare score by
running a separate regression for all the non-zero
net welfare score observations. The coefficient of
our variable of interest remains positive and statis-
tically significant at the 1% significance level. All
in all, we conclude that our results are robust to
alternate definitions of the dependent variable, al-
ternate sample and peer compositions, and remain
significant even after controlling for reverse causal-
ity, simultaneity and omitted variable bias.
Identification strategy
Addressing the endogeneity issue is an important
aspect of this research, since peers’ welfare poli-
cies might be endogenously chosen and might be
related to other unobservable factors that can also
affect a firm’s employee welfare practices. Using
TNIC-based peers mitigates some of the endo-
geneity concerns due to the peers’ dynamic nature
(Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). However, we use the
instrumental variable technique to furthermitigate
concerns about potential endogeneity problems in
our results. Specifically, we create a state-level wel-
fare index and utilize this variable as an instru-
ment in Table 7. To create this index, we use three
federal labour laws. The first is the wrongful dis-
charge law, having sub-categories of public policy
exception, good faith exception and implied con-
tract exception; a state is free to choose any or
none of these exceptions. These laws protect em-
ployees from wrongful dismissal/discharge, hence
increasing job security.6 We create a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 for each sub-category of this law if
the state implements this law, and 0 otherwise.
The second law is the Family andMedical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 1993, which ensures that employ-
ers provide job-protected family andmedical leave.
Again, states vary in adopting this law;many states
have surpassed federal FMLA laws by providing
exceptional leave and other benefits to newparents.
Based on the National Partnership for Women
and Families 2016 report, we define California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin as
states having strong family leave laws.7 We create
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all these
states, and 0 otherwise.
The third law that we use to devise our state wel-
fare index is the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) of 1970. This law was created to en-
sure safe and healthy working conditions by en-
couraging and assisting states in their efforts to-
wards this cause. Similar to the above two acts,
states differ in the implementation of this law. We
collect data for states that have their own unique
approved OSHA plans from the U.S. Department
of Labor and create a dummy variable equal to 1
for all such states, and 0 otherwise.8
To create a state-level welfare index, we sum all
the dummy variables on a state basis to create an
index, based on scores in each set of laws. Further,
to make this variable an industry-level instrument,
we take the average peer state welfare score of all
the TNIC-based peers outside the state in which
the firm is headquartered. The setting meets the
exclusion restriction as the average state welfare in-
dex based on other states’ welfare is positively cor-
related with peer employee welfare through TNIC-
based peers. However, this instrument is only re-
lated to the firm’s employee welfare through peer
average employee welfare and not otherwise. The
average state welfare is expected to impact the
6See Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2006) for further dis-
cussion on this law and a complete explanation of sub-
categories.
7For the complete report, entitled Expecting Better: A
State by State Analysis of Laws that Help New Par-
ents, visit www.nationalpartnership.org.We use the report
published in 2016.
8See https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/ for additional de-
tails on OSHA state plans.
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peers outside the state in which the firm resides
and not the firm itself, as we do not include the
state welfare score of the firm’s state in calculating
the average. We report the results of regression us-
ing the state-level welfare index as an instrument in
Table 7. The results show that the coefficient of in-
terest (both instrument and independent variable)
is significant and positive for our 2SLS IV regres-
sions in columns 1 and 2 at a 10% significance level,
respectively.
To further remove any endogeneity bias aris-
ing from reverse causality or simultaneity bias, we
use the dynamic generalized method of moments
(GMM) model in column 3 of Table 7. Again, our
results for independent variables remain significant
at the 1% level using the dynamicGMMapproach,
supporting our preliminary results of strong peer
effects in a firm’s employee welfare policies and re-
jecting any endogeneity concerns.
Additional analysis
Channels of peer mimicking in employee welfare
To determine which types of pressure motivate a
firm tomimic its peer firms’ employee welfare poli-
cies, we examine the three isomorphic pressures.
While examining the coercive pressure, we use the
state-level welfare index as discussed earlier to ob-
serve a firm’s reaction within a state towards its
welfare index. This channel was examined in two
ways. First, as reported in column 1 of Table 8, we
directly regress the net employee welfare score on
the state-level welfare score while controlling for
other firm-specific and TNIC-based peer averages
of control variables. The purpose here is to exam-
ine how firms react to the state-level welfare pol-
icy index. The results show an insignificant rela-
tionship, indicating that state-level welfare policies
do not drive the firms’ employee welfare policies.
Second, we also examine the reaction of the focal
firms towards their TNIC-based peers inside the
state. This is to examine if firms mimic the em-
ployee welfare policies of their TNIC peers within
the state. Since our main variable of interest is
within the state, it may capture some of the state
welfare policies if found to be significant. The re-
sults in column 2 of Table 8 show that a firm’s wel-
fare policy is unrelated to its local TNICpeers’wel-
fare policies. Thus, we do not find any evidence of
coercive pressures driving a firm’s employee wel-
fare policies.
Next, we examine themimetic pressures through
the channels of exposure to competition and infor-
mation asymmetry. Here, we measure competition
with the TNIC-based Herfindahl index (TNIC
HHI), and information asymmetry is measured
with the number of analysts following a firm.
Higher values of TNIC HHI and analyst coverage
mean low competition and information asymme-
try. In column 3 of Table 8, we report the impact of
peers’ employee welfare policies on the firm’s wel-
fare policies conditional on its exposure to com-
petition. In this specification, we include TNIC
HHI as well as its interaction with our main in-
dependent variable as additional variables. The re-
sults show that the positive relationship between a
firm’s employee welfare policy and its peers’ sim-
ilar policies is stronger for firms that are less ex-
posed to competition. We report the tests related
to the information asymmetry channel in column
4 of Table 8. The results conclude that the posi-
tive relationship between a firm and its peers’ em-
ployee welfare policies is stronger for firms with
higher analyst coverage (low information asym-
metry), which is consistent with the reputational
channel.
Lastly, we test the normative pressure by ex-
amining the firm’s reaction to the ‘best fortune’
peer. To create the fortune peers, we exploit the
data for the 100 best companies to work for, which
is taken from Fortune Magazine, which publishes
this information as a yearly list. Ghaly, Dang and
Stathopoulos (2015) have used this measure as a
proxy for employee welfare in their study relat-
ing to cash holding and employee welfare. We uti-
lize this data and generate a dummy variable equal
to 1 for the year in which the firm is present in
the list of 100 best companies to work for, and
0 otherwise. Similar to Balsam, Puthenpurackal
and Upadhyay (2016) and Disatnik, Duchin and
Schmidt (2014), the fortune peers measure is com-
puted by taking the average of employee welfare
scores of all fortune peer firms on an annual ba-
sis, excluding firm i, where peers are defined us-
ing TNIC. The idea here is to see whether firms
follow the best employee welfare firms (normative
pressures) by adopting these professional firms’
best practices. Column 5 of Table 8 reports regres-
sion results using average fortune peers’ employee
welfare score as our main independent variable.
The results show that firms follow the average wel-
fare score of TNIC-based fortune peers, which is
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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validating the channel of normative pressures on
peers.
Economic consequence of peer following in
employee welfare
In this section, we examine the economic con-
sequences of following peer firms in employee
welfare policies. Specifically, we examine how the
firm’s value and innovation are affected by its de-
cisions to mimic peers in employee welfare. We use
a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) tech-
nique, where we use firm’s peer Emp. Welfare as an
instrumented variable for its own employee welfare
in the first-stage regression. In the second stage, the
instrumented peer Emp. Welfare is used to see how
it affects the firm’s value measured through Tobin’s
Q. The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show
that firms that follow peers and change their em-
ployee welfare scores accordingly tend to have bet-
ter firm value. The results show the positive out-
comes of mimicking peers’ employee welfare in the
form of better firm value.
We also examine the impact of following peers
in employee welfare on firms’ innovation (mea-
sured as the number of patents and patent ci-
tations). The first proxy measures innovation in
terms of the number of patents received during a
particular year, while the second proxy measures
the quality of the innovation through the num-
ber of patent citations. Using 2SLS regression (as
above), we report the first and second-stage estima-
tion results for both proxies in columns 3–6 of Ta-
ble 9. Similar to earlier estimations of firm value,
a firm’s employee welfare policy is instrumented
through its peers’ employee welfare policies. The
results provide a useful insight into the innova-
tion literature as following peers in employee wel-
fare not only increases a firm’s innovation (as we
have a positive and significant association between
the firm’s instrumented employee welfare and the
number of patents), but also increases its patent
citations, as shown in column 6 of Table 9. The re-
sults are consistent with Chen et al.’s (2016) earlier
findings, showing similar results between a firm’s
employee treatment and its patents.
Conclusion
Regardless of the rich literature on the causes
and value consequences of human capital, little is
known about how peer firms impact employee wel-
fare practices. In this paper, we answer this ques-
tion by examining how firms react to their prod-
uct market peers’ employee welfare policies. We
find that firms mimic their peers in employee wel-
fare policies, suggesting that firms’ employee wel-
fare policies are largely influenced by their peers’
employee welfare policies. Our results are robust
to alternative estimation techniques, including the
alternate proxy for the dependent variable, an al-
ternate definition of peers and other robustness
tests.
To further validate our results, we performed
several endogeneity tests, including instrumental
variable analysis and the dynamic GMM model.
Specifically, we utilize the state-level welfare mea-
sure as our instrument. Using this instrument, we
find herding behaviour in firms’ employee welfare
policies. Our additional analysis shows that non-
successful companies follow successful ones, but
not vice versa. Further, we also show that mimetic
and normative isomorphism play a significant role
in driving peer effects. Finally, we examine the eco-
nomic consequences of peer following in employee
welfare by showing that it improves focal firms’
value and innovation.
The findings of this study have several impli-
cations. Firstly, the peer effects and herding be-
haviour of employee welfare policies could be ap-
plied in other corporate policies through using the
reputational herding model. Secondly, the find-
ings of the study could be an important point
of learning for firms that they should not ignore
their peers’ policies. Thirdly, the channel analysis
for economic consequences for peer firms’ policies
could be interesting for firms’ financial implica-
tions.
Despite the contributions this study makes, it
has some limitations. The study relies on sec-
ondary data; however, considering the context
of this research, using primary data in the form
of a questionnaire survey and interviews with
the firms’ policymakers and executives will pro-
vide further insights. As policymakers and firms’
executives are involved in establishing their em-
ployee welfare policies, knowing their views will
provide further clarification. However, due to
time and resource constraints, such an investi-
gation is left for future research. We hope that
further research in this area will provide better
insights into the peer effects on firms’ welfare
policies.
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